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The problem of racial discrimination has reached a point of equipoise.
When one examines closely the lived lives of citizens of color across some
of the most pertinent evaluative domains, one clearly finds that citizens of
color are not enjoying the full benefits of American citizenship. African
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans lag behind Whites and some-
times Asian Americans on almost all relevant socio-economic indicators.
What it means to be an American citizen is different for most folks of color
than for most Whites. Looking at the gaping racial disparities on most
socio-economic indicators, there are clearly two classes of citizens: Whites
and coloreds. Very few individuals would dispute the fact that we have a
race problem.
However, with the elimination of de jure discrimination presaged by
constitutional and statutory commitments to formal racial equality, we seem
to have exhausted the possibilities of positive law, including constitutional
lawmaking, to achieve greater racial equality. Simple legal prescriptions,
statutory and constitutional, are most effective in precluding overt inten-
tional racial discrimination and in eliminating de jure discrimination. Law is
significantly less effective when put to more offensive use-that is, as a
sword of racial equality-as opposed to defensive use-that is, as a shield to
defend racial equality measures.
It is then no surprise that the civil rights movement is dead and that a
racial malaise has set in. We have very little to say about race because we
have reached a point of equilibrium that is destined to rigorously enforce
formal equality but never reach actual racial parity. Actual parity among the
races is elusive because it would demand a commitment by the state to dis-
mantling the structural underpinnings of racial exclusion. This is a commit-
ment that does not currently exist from the positive law framework and is
not currently on the public policy agenda.
In her most recent piece, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing
Workplace Equity in Higher Education, Professor Susan Sturm provides
much needed guidance toward destabilizing this perverse equilibrium.'
Building upon previous work that identifies the structural pathologies of dis-
crimination,2 Professor Sturm turns her focus to higher education to reveal
the micro-structural elements of inclusion. She focuses in particular on gen-
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der inclusion, in the university as both an educational institution and as a
place of employment. Sturm develops a framework that re-conceives the
role of the state and empowers institutions to address the problem of gender
disparities.
An important implication from Professor Sturm's piece is the realiza-
tion that the current legal framework is incapable of redressing persistent
racial inequalities. 3 If the post-Brown experience has proved anything, it has
certainly proved the limitations of courts and constitutional law (and to a
significantly much lesser extent, positive law more generally) in actuating
racial equality. Although constitutional law (and by extension courts) was
capable of articulating a norm of racial equality, it has not been capable of
vigorously enforcing that norm. Indeed, as Professor Sturm notes, the law
itself, in particular constitutional law, might be an impediment to change.4
Not only are courts limited in their ability to enforce equality, they have also
severely limited the ability of the state to vigorously implement a more ag-
gressive and expansive conception of racial inclusion.
The point here is that even if progressives receive everything that they
want from the courts, the problem of racial exclusion is too intractable at a
structural and institutional level to be resolved by courts. Professor Sturm's
paper is built upon the premise that a paradigm shift is in order and long
overdue.5
In this Response Essay, I use Sturm's framework to think about the
macro-structural elements of racial exclusion. Part I of this Review identi-
fies what I view as the key moves of Sturm's approach. Some of these
moves are explicit, others less so. These moves include: (1) a focus on the
structural determinants of exclusion; (2) a conceptual shift from equality to
citizenship; and (3) perhaps most profoundly, a much-needed emphasis on
the importance of socio-economic institutions as guardians of inclusion and
exclusion. Part II explores the utility of Sturm's framework for thinking
about the problem of race and citizenship. Two quick caveats before pro-
ceeding. First, while Professor Sturm's focus is on gender, mine will be on
race. Leaving aside this important difference, the structural elements of ex-
clusion that she identifies are largely transferable to race. Second, while
Professor Sturm is concerned with micro-structural elements of exclusion, I
am interested in identifying the macro-structural elements.
I. LAW's FAILURE
For those deeply concerned about the persistence of gender and racial
inequality, the crucial question of the twenty-first century is how to achieve
full inclusion in the absence of explicit raceconscious measures by the state
I Sturm, supra note 1, at 248-49.
4 Id. at 249, 260.
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and within constitutional limitations. As Professor Sturm's paper makes
clear, the civil rights movement has stalled.6 It has stalled in large part be-
cause the movement has relied, to its detriment, upon law and the modem
legal regime to promote equality. Progressives were seduced by the tanta-
lizing vision of a Supreme Court, best exemplified by Brown v. Board of
Education,7 that would order the eradication of racial inequality and it would
be so. Brown and its progeny promoted a court-centric framework of racial
equality.
In retrospect, it is important to acknowledge that proponents of racial
equality were wrong on a number of counts. To be sure, courts served an
important and critical function by (1) articulating a norm of racial equality,
(2) serving as catalysts for change, and (3) removing legally-imposed bound-
aries that served as markers of second-class citizenship. However, this was
about as much as courts could do in the fight for racial equality. Because of
this court-centric approach, progressives underestimated the intractability of
racial inequality and overestimated the capacity of courts as agents of
change. Progressives assumed that Brown represented the beginning of a
court-driven approach to racial inclusion; rather, Brown, in hindsight, was its
zenith.
To be clear, the principles that Brown stands for, though contested, have
had a tremendous impact on the lives of people of color in the United States.
The same can be said, more generally, with respect to the liberal activism of
the Warren Court on race issues. The progress on race that is attributed to
the civil rights movement and culminated in Brown is real and ought to be
celebrated. We have indeed come a long way. Nevertheless, we have a long
way to go.
Consider some basic socio-economic indicators. Figures 1-3 compare
the status of Whites, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native
Americans with respect to three basic health care categories: infant mortal-
ity, percent of individuals that lack health care coverage, and percent of indi-
viduals that are in fair or poor health by race. As Figure 1 depicts, African
Americans have the highest rate of infant mortality among the racial groups
examined.' African-American mothers experience almost fourteen deaths
per 1,000 live births.9 This rate is three times more than the rate for Asian
Americans and more than twice the rate for Whites and Latinos.10 Native
6 Sturm, supra note 1, at 248.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Graph in Figure 1 created from data in: FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD
AND FAMILY STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Table HEALTH7
Infant Mortality: Death Rates Among Infants by Detailed Race and Hispanic Origin of
Mother, Selected Years, 1983-2003, in AMERICA'S CHILDREN IN BRIEF: KEY NATIONAL
INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING (2006), available at http://www.childstats.gov/americaschil-
dren/xls/health7.xls (infant deaths per 1,000 live births for 2003).9 Id.
"I Id. The infant mortality rate for Latinos is misleading because of the inclusion of
Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans with all others of Hispanic descent. Puerto Ricans
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Americans have the second-highest rate of infant mortality; they experience
an infant mortality rate of almost nine deaths per 1,000 live births."
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With respect to the availability of health care coverage and poor health,
African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans are again at the bottom
of the barrel. As Figure 2 shows, 36% of Native Americans, 34% of Lati-
nos, and 18% of African Americans are without health care coverage.' 2 This
compares with 12% of Whites, 15% of Native Hawaiians, and 17% of
Asians.' 3 With respect to health quality by race, as Figure 3 indicates, al-
most 16% of Native Americans reported being in fair or poor health.14 The
numbers were similar for Blacks, Native Hawaiians, and Latinos, which re-
have an infant mortality rate of 8.2 deaths per 1,000 live births. This rate is closer to the
rates of Native Americans and African Americans. Cuban Americans, on the other hand,
experience an infant mortality rate of 4.6 deaths per 1,000 live births, a rate lower than
that experienced by both Asian Americans and Whites. Id.
11 Id.
12 Graph in Figure 2 created from data in: NATL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH DATA FOR ALL AGES (2004), http://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/health_data_for-all-ages.htm (follow "Health Care Access and Use"hyperlink; then follow "Health Insurance: lack of coverage, persons under 65 years of
age, US, 2002-2005" hyperlink) (statistics are percentage averaged for 2002-2004).
1 Id.
14 Graph in Figure 3 created from data in: NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH DATA FOR ALL AGES (2004), http://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/health_data_for_all-ages.htm (follow "Health Status and Disability"hyperlink; then follow "Health Status, all ages: US, 2002-2005" hyperlink) (statistics are
percentage averaged for 2002-2005).
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ported 14.3%, 14.3%, and 13.2%, respectively.1 5 By comparison, Asians
and Whites reported 7.5% and 8.1%, respectively. 6
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Figure 4 provides some basic economic data by race. As Figure 4 de-
picts, on average, African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans have
median household incomes of $30,000, $34,000, and $33,000 respectively.' 7
By contrast, on average, Whites and Asians have median household incomes
each year of $49,000 and $57,000, respectively." The White household in-
come is 1.6 times that of the African-American household income. Consis-
tent with the data on income, the data on the percent of individuals below the
poverty line by race, not surprisingly, reflect similar racial disparities. As
Figure 5 shows, 24% of Native Americans, 25% of Black Americans, and
22% of Latinos live below the poverty line. 9 The percent of Native Ameri-
cans, Blacks, and Latinos below the poverty line is more than three times the
rate of Whites, which is 8%, and more than twice that of Asian Americans,
which is 11%.20
In The State of Black America 2006, 21 the annual report on the socio-
economic status of African Americans published by the Urban League, Marc
Morial, the President of the Urban League, provides the results of the Urban
League's Equality Index, a cumulative compilation of the status of African
Americans in comparison with Whites in the areas of economics, health,
15 Id.
16Id.
" Graph in Figure 4 created from data in: CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 6 tbl.2 (2005), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf (statistics are average for 2003-2004).
"1/ Id.
19 Id. at 12 tbl.4.
20 Id.
2' THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2006: THE OPPOR-
TUNITY COMPACT (2006), available for purchase at http://www.nul.org/stateofblack
america.html [hereinafter THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA].
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
education, social justice, and civic engagement.22 Morial reported that for
the past three years, the Index has calculated the status of African Americans
as about 0.73 of Whites: "the U.S. Constitution counted an African Ameri-
can as 3/5 of a person for purposes of taxation and state representation in
Congress, an Index value of 0.60. Today, African Americans' index value
stands at 0.73-0.13 improvement over the last 217 years!"' 23
The lived lives of citizens of color, particularly African Americans 24
and Native Americans, but also Latinos and sometimes Asian Americans,
differ significantly from the lived lives of most Whites. An examination of
relevant socio-economic indicator reveals a consistent inequality. Predict-
ably and persistently, certain groups of American citizens do less well on
critical socio-economic indicators than others. Despite the end of de jure
discrimination, we still have two classes of citizens: the first class is mainly
White and the second class is mainly Black and Latino.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF Socio-ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
One of the most important moves in Professor Sturm's paper is the rec-
ognition that socio-economic institutions must be necessary and critical part-
ners in the struggle for full inclusion. In the old civil rights paradigm, the
state was solely responsible for implementing racial inclusion. This was in
part because the state was viewed as the primary discriminator, and partly
because our legal framework maintains a substantial distinction between
state action and private action.
The old paradigm suffers from two problems. The first, as noted above,
is that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause has
severely constrained the ability of the state to promulgate an aggressive vi-
sion of racial inclusion. 25 Second, by focusing on the state as both primary
offender and defender of equality norms, the old paradigm ignored the fact
that people of color interacted with a large number of non-state (and some-
times quasi-state) institutional actors. These institutional actors were both
potential offenders and possible defenders of equality norms.
The genius of Professor Sturm's article is she helps us understand that
full equality can never be achieved within the confines of a paradigm that
relies so totally upon the state. She turns our attention from the limitations
on the state to the possibilities of socio-economic institutions. She demon-
strates this point by articulating and cataloguing very meticulously in one
domain how to achieve greater inclusion (defined as reducing the relevant
"22 Marc H. Morial, The National Urban League Opportunity Compact, in THE STATE
OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 21, at 9.
23 Id.
24 The focus of this Essay is on African Americans in large part because African
Americans consistently find themselves on the bottom of the rung, and also because Afri-
can Americans have served as the paradigmatic "other" in American society.
25 Id. at 260.
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gap between Whites and people of color) by using a quasi-state institutional
actor. 26 As Professor Sturm shows, institutions matter because they are the
primary entities with which folks of color interact.27 If socio-economic insti-
tutions can be induced to serve as promoters of inclusion norms, it becomes
possible to improve the lived lives of citizens of color. Institutions, as op-
posed to the state, become the unit of analysis and those interested in im-
proving the lives to citizens of color can address the problems of exclusion
at the level at which they exist.
Professor Sturm has outlined the contours of an institutional approach
to inclusion. To build upon her approach, future work will need to continue
mapping out the territory. Researchers can begin by identifying which
socio-economic institutions are critical and must be part of the equation if
we are to have a society in which the goal of full inclusion is realized. That
is, researchers should develop criteria to determine whether there are partic-
ularly critical institutions that ought to be part of an initial wave of study.
For example, it might be the case that educational institutions are critical
socio-economic institutions in the fight for full inclusion. A similar argu-
ment can be made about workplaces. From a different perspective, research-
ers might focus on institutions where there are significant gaps between the
ideal of full inclusion and the reality of exclusion. Alternatively, it might
also be useful to examine institutions where one can make a significant im-
pact with minimal investment.
In addition, further work can be done by identifying portable and non-
portable aspects of inclusionary norms as applied to socio-economic institu-
tions. For example, using Professor Sturm's case study, it is worth inquiring
whether public universities are sufficiently similar to private universities that
we can expect like results in the private university context. Or one can in-
quire whether we can expect similar success at the elementary public school
level as in the public university level. Switching domains altogether, one
might ask whether universities are like hospitals, such that one might expect
similar success if the framework is imported from the university setting to
the hospital setting, etc. Mapping the terrain here will be tedious but neces-
sary work to achieve full inclusion at the critical points of exclusion. Profes-
sor Sturm has provided a wonderful model.
III. TAKING CITIZENSHIP SERIOUSLY
Lastly, the third critical move in Professor Sturm's paper is a linguistic
shift from the concept of equality to the concept of citizenship. The move to
citizenship is significant for three reasons.
26 Id. at 249-50.
27 Id.
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First, Professor Sturm introduces the critical concept of institutional cit-
izenship into the equation.28 Institutional citizenship is the idea that socio-
economic institutions have a stake in the social order beyond their immedi-
ate corporate or institutional purpose. Institutional citizenship provides both
an internal and an external justification for action by socio-economic institu-
tions. When institutions ask themselves why they ought to care about racial
inclusion, answers might vary. Certainly, almost all will have an economic
justification-inclusion is good for the bottom line. But they can also have
a political theoretical justification: as citizens (though citizens perhaps of a
slightly different sort), socio-economic institutions bear responsibility for
being agents of inclusion within the spheres under their control.
Encouraging institutions to think of themselves as institutional citizens
may be the most promising avenue for achieving full inclusion. Although
most socio-economic institutions may be profit-oriented, they may not, as a
normative matter, want to be viewed as passive agents of exclusion. Con-
sider the fact that the push for same-sex domestic partner benefits is not
coming from the state or really organized outsider activists but from institu-
tions themselves. Admittedly, providing domestic partner benefits might
make good business sense; but we should encourage institutions to hold
themselves accountable for the impact that their behavior has on the polity.
Similarly, in Minnesota, leading law firms and corporations have come
together to create an entity called Twin Cities Diversity in Practice in order
to attract and retain attorneys of color. 29 These firms are not being driven by
"civil rights activists" or by the threat of legal sanctions. They are driven by
their sense of their role in the fight for full inclusion. Thus, there is some-
thing to be said for thinking of institutions as institutional citizens that are
obligated to be agents of inclusion.
There is more to be said about the concept of institutional citizenship.
Professor Sturm identifies the funding role of the state in providing an incen-
tive for institutions to be inclusive.3 0 It is worth thinking about other roles
that the state might play that do not rely upon the threat of legal sanction to
incentivize inclusionary behavior.3" The point here is to note this develop-
ment as extremely useful and to encourage further exploration of its
meaning.
The move to citizenship more broadly (not institutional citizenship but
the concept of citizenship itself) is significant for a second reason. As a
matter of linguistic rhetoric, the idea of citizenship seems to connote and
28 Id. at 301, 323.
29 See Twin Cities Diversity in Practice, http://www.diversityinpractice.org/ (last vis-
ited May 28, 2007).
30 Sturm, supra note 1, at 327-28.
" For example, might a public university be justified in administering a racially ex-
clusive scholarship that is provided by a private institution to enable students of color to
attend the university? The administration of the scholarship, by reducing one transaction
cost, might incentivize the private actor, by providing the scholarship, to view itself as an
agent of inclusion.
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evoke a normative responsibility more so than the idea of equality. I am not
quite sure about this, but it seems to me that equality seems to be more
backward-looking than forward-looking. This is why we talk about and take
seriously the concept of equality of opportunity, but disdain the more for-
ward-looking, valenced conception of equality of results.
This same problem does not seem to exist with the concept of citizen-
ship. The idea of citizenship lends itself, more so than the idea of equality,
to thinking more broadly about problems of exclusion and inclusion. Con-
sider a brief example. African-American mothers experience about fourteen
deaths per 1,000 live births.32 This is a rate that is three times more than the
rate for Whites. Taking this example, we can constructively inquire about
what it means to be a black citizen in a polity where the lives of African-
American children have less value than those of White children. Or, we can
query whether Latinos, Native Americans, and African Americans are full
citizens when their average individual incomes are half that of Whites.
The concept of equality does not provide us with much purchase on
those questions. Once formal equality is established, equality rhetoric may
not have anything else to contribute to the discussion. By contrast, when
one examines these and other racial disparities, one can begin to recognize
the differential classes of citizenship and then ask whether the polity has an
obligation to its citizens to reduce, if not eliminate, the tiers. The very idea
of citizenship connotes obligation. Citizenship enables to ask about the core
content of the government's obligation to individuals as well as the mini-
mum that we owe to one another as members of the same polity.
This is a fundamental difference between the backward-looking concept
of equality and the forward-looking concept of citizenship. As a matter of
rhetoric, we might be able to compel the polity to take disparate impact
among the races more seriously by using the language of citizenship rather
than the language of equality. Put differently, can one really say that Blacks
and Whites are full citizens of the polity where the experiences of Blacks
and Whites differ dramatically on all relevant socio-economic indicators? I
am surmising that if the concept of citizenship means anything, it must com-
pel at least an investigation into the distinctions among the races.
I am ready to admit that these conceptions may be context-dependent
social constructions. That is, perhaps in a different society, equality might
do more work compared to citizenship than it does in this society. It may be
the case that our conception of equality is not useful because in this society
it is so fixed and backward-looking. On the other hand, as Peter Westen
argued, it may also be the case that equality is such an empty concept that
we should never have expected it to do the work that needs to be done in
order to achieve full racial inclusion.33
32 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
31 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982).
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This leads us to the third reason why this move is significant. Unlike
equality, the concept of citizenship is much less defined by and thus less
constrained by constitutional doctrine. If this is true, it means that a focus
on citizenship instead of equality might reinvigorate the moribund legal
framework. I do not think that constitutional doctrine can be fashioned to
serve as a sword for achieving racial inclusion, but it might serve as a shield.
Take Grutter v. Bollinger3 4 as an example. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor
implicitly recognized that if citizens of color are to be truly full citizens of
the polity with the norm of inclusion that the concept entails, then the polity
must be sufficiently responsive to the needs of citizens of color.35 The state
is permitted to do more than establish race-neutral admissions criteria. As
full citizens of the polity, citizens of color must be permitted to aspire to be
lawyers and realistically expect to matriculate at the best legal institutions.3 6
This concept of citizenship gets us beyond the confining framework of
equality: viz., whether the state is being race-conscious. Citizenship enables
us to examine the lived lives of citizens of color and to ask whether the state
has an obligation to act to change their reality. The constitutional shift to
citizenship can serve as a defense for the state when it so acts or when it acts
in conjunction with private actors. Citizenship shifts the inquiry from one
about means to one about results. It shifts the focus from one primarily on
White citizens (victims under the equality construct) to citizens of color (ob-
jects under the citizenship construct).
There is more to be said about citizenship. It would be useful to articu-
late the difference among political citizenship, institutional citizenship, and
social citizenship. Suffice it to say for now, given the limits of equality
discourse, it is worth exploring whether a different conceptual vehicle might
help us think about and resolve some of the obstacles that citizens of color
face in this polity.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the late 1970s, Professor Kenneth Karst wrote a seminal article on
citizenship and the Constitution.3 7 In that article and a series of subsequent
articles, Professor Karst explored the constitutional principle of equal citi-
zenship and what that might mean for inclusion.38 Unfortunately, the civil
rights community failed to grapple with and build upon the ideas expressed
by Professor Karst.
4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
I5ld. at 331-33.3 6 Id.
3' Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1977).
31 See, e.g., id.; Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race and Marginality, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level: The Con-
sequences of Nonstate Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591 (2005).
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There can be little doubt that a new civil rights framework is required.
In The Architecture of Inclusion, Professor Sturm builds upon Professor
Karst's work as she carefully explores the barriers to inclusion and the
micro-level commitments that it would take to achieve full inclusion. She
has reinvigorated the citizenship concept by helping us understand how in-
stitutions can be partners in the quest for full inclusion. The critical point
here is that socio-economic institutions are the gatekeepers of inclusion and
exclusion. Additionally, positive law is of limited use in the quest for full
inclusion. Lastly, as Professor Sturm demonstrates, if we are serious about
the task of inclusion, we must carefully and painstakingly examine the archi-
tecture of inclusion and build realistic models that will help us achieve our
goal. We are in need of a new blueprint for the post-civil rights world, and
we are fortunate to have Susan Sturm as one of our key architects.
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